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China’s WTO accession has entered a critical stage.  At the Seattle Ministerial Meeting 
to be held in late November a new round (the Millenium Round) of WTO multilateral 
trade talks is expected to be launched.  It is also widely expected that this round will be 
short (probably about three years).  If China does not enter the WTO soon, it may miss 
out on the opportunity to parici te in the negotiations.  On the domestic front, 
China’s SOE  reform has also entered a critical stage.  While SOE reform has its own 
logic and underlining driving forces, timely WTO accession would provide a much 
needed boost to the now lingering SOE reform. 
Current state of negotiations 
This is perhaps why Zhu Rongji went to the US with unprecedented ‘concessions’ on 
China’s WTO offer in April this year.  Of course, that bold move by Zhu did not lead 
to the conclusion of the Sino-US bilateral negotiations, which are critical to the final 
conclusion of the accession negotiations.  Nevertheless, the visit and offer have put 
further negotiations on a positive and momentous basis. 
Tariff reductions in Zhu’s offer are substantial.1  Aver ge tariff levels wi l be brought 
down from the current level of 25 per cent to 9 per cent. China has also pledged to 
phase out all quotas on industrial products, most within a couple of years and a few 
within 5 years.  Sensitive agricultural commodities (mainly grain) will be subject to 
tariff-rate quotas.  In-quota tariff rates are minimal (1-3 percent), and initial quotas are 
generally well above the current levels of imports and they will grow at generous rates.  
Overall, the USTR claims that China’s market access offer is comparable with or better 
than those of major US trading partners, including developed country partners (Tariffs 
on US exports will be 7 per cent after the reductions). 
Most of the remaining stumbling blocks seem to be in service industries, although even 
there substantial progress has been made in distribution, telecommunications, 
professional services, travel and tourism.  In general, China has agreed to lift its 
restrictions on the scope, location and extent of foreign equity participation in China’s 
service industries.  Foreign firms will be free to enter most service industries wherever 
they want to locate.   Majority and wholly foreign ownership is allowed in many 
industries. 
Industries where differences still need to be resolved include banking, insurance a d 
audiovisual, in addition to agricultural export subsidies. Issues which need to be settled 
are the scope, location and extent of foreign participation in these industries.  The 
banking sector will be particularly difficult as China tries to restructure its failing 
                                                       
1 The following are based on the USTR Press Release on 8 April 1999.  Chinese officials have 
subsequently denied that China has agreed to everything in that press release. 
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banking system.  The fear there is that if China allows foreign competition in a short 
period of time, domestic banks will be forced out of the market, causing banking 
crises.  Audiovisual services are also very sensitive.  Over the past twen y ye rs of 
reform, the Communist Party and the Government have been consciously trying to 
avoid any Western cultural influence while gradually integrating China into the world 
economy.  The industry will no doubt take advantage of this concern and rally support 
from conservative forces to maintain sta us quo. 
On the rules embodied in the draft Protocol of China’s WTO Accession, it is claimed 
that China will comply with TRIMS Agreement and the WTO Agreement on State 
Trading.  The most noteworthy aspects of the draft Protocol are fourfold.  First, the 
US will be able to treat China as a non-market economy for the purpose of 
antidumping and countervailing purposes.  This implies that the US will be able to use 
third country reference prices to determine if Chinese exporting firms are dumping or 
their exports have been subsidised.  The second important and disturbing aspect is that 
China has the obligation of voluntarily restraint on its exports if they ‘are a significant 
cause of material injury’.  The US as insisted on this despite the ban of VERs by the 
Uruguay Round Agreement.  This sets a dangerous precedent for other transitional 
economies which are lining up for WTO membership.  The third aspect is that the US 
can apply restraints on Chinese exports unilaterally based on standards that are lower 
than those in the WTO Safeguard Agreement.  Again this is a direct violation of the 
non-discrimination principle.  Finally, the agreement allows the US to restrict Chinese 
textile exports five years after MFA quotas will have been phased out for all other 
developing countries. 
The benefits of WTO accession 
Despite these problems, there is little doubt that China’s WTO accession will benefit 
both China and its trading partners.  Certainly, some industries, especially the SOE-
dominated heavy industries and some mordern service sectors, such banking and 
insurance, will be hurt by greater market access, but some other industries will expand 
because of improved market access overseas and reduced costs of imports.  In he end, 
overall economic activities will expand as the resources will be used more efficiently. 
Perhaps the largest benefit of WTO accession to China is its impact on its trade regime.  
China’s current trade system evolved from central planning and still lacks tran parency. 
This has provided breeding ground for rent-seeking and is often at the centre of 
complaints by China’s trading partners.  Greater transparency in the trade regime will 
also have profound implications for the rest of the economy. This is particularly 
important for SOE reform where transparent rules are lacking and their lock-in is 
needed. 
Other benefits are also likely to be significant.  First of all, lower protection and greater 
transparency would reduce the rampant corruption which has aroused great concern by 
the authority and ordinary citizens.  Smuggling would fall as a result of tariff 
reductions.  After all, all these are consistent with China’s objective of building a 
modern market economy with ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. 
China will also be able to enjoy more secured market access.  Apart from laying to rest 
the acrimonious annual MFA renewals in the US, China will be in a much better 
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position to tackle discriminatory trade restrictions using the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. China will have more influence over the path of future rounds of WTO 
negotiations.  This can benefit China as well as other developing countries, particularly 
if China plays a positive role with regard to high tariffs on textile products in industial 
countries. Potential longer-term benefits include more balanced treatment of 
environmental and social issues (such as labour standards) in the future rounds of 
WTO talks. 
The political economy of WTO accession 
If China’s WTO accession has so much to offer, why it has taken so long and yet there 
is still no sign of resolution.  The answer to this question lies in the political market.  
As China moves away from a central planing economy to a market oriented one, 
enterprises become more accountable for their financial performance.  Trade policies 
begin to affect their profitability.  Like in all other countries, democratic or otherwise, 
industrial interest groups devote resources to lobbying the government.  These interest 
groups are often represented by the government departments which supervise and 
regulate them.  This is best demonstrated by the uproar from various ministries after 
Zhu Rongji’s WTO offer was made public by the USTR. MOFTEC officials were 
grilled when they tried to explain the planned concessions to various ministries in 
charge of agriculture, banks, audiovisual, cars and telecommunications.  These interest 
groups have much of the popular support.  Not only widespread unemployment has 
cast doubt on the value of WTO accession in the minds of worker , but also disputes 
over issues such as Taiwan and human rights between China and the West have led to 
much resentment to the West. 
 In China’s trading partners, especially the US, the political economy surrounding 
China’s WTO is even more complicated.  There, not only industrial groups have gone 
all out trying to curb China’s competitive exports, such as garments and toys, an 
unusual alliance has formed over a wide spectrum of interest groups, ranging from 
religious rights to anti- bortion activists.  Their strong lobby has resulted in a protocol 
of China’s accession that is clearly discriminatory.  Counter forces represented by US 
exporting industries do exist, but the strength of their persuasion is greatly undermined 
by the allegations over their ‘putting profits before national security’ in exporting to 
China.  In the end, President Clinton did not accept Zhu Rongji’s offer in April, which 
was widely regarded as to have well exceeded US expectations prior to Zhu’s visit. 
The prospect 
With the Seattle meeting just a month away, what is the prospect for China’s WTO 
accession?  The short answer is that time has run out for this year.  The best one can 
hope is that the ongoing negotiations will keep the momentum and by the time of the 
Seattle Meeting a broad agreement can be reached and the accession process is firmly 
on track.  But this will not guarantee that China will enter the WTO in the near future.  
With US presidential election campaign under way in earnest, China’s WTO accession 
is unlikely to be an issue to be taken up positively by politicians.  On the China side, 
WTO accession is also a risky business for politicians.  The premiership will be open 
for contention in 2001, but political maneuvering will start much earlier.  Zhu Rongji 
may have wanted to boost his mandate by fast-tracking WTO accession after his 
popularity has sunk with slow SOE reform but steady increases in unemployment.  Will 
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China have a premiership candidate who dare to offer unprecedented ‘concessions’ to 
the West? 
 
